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THE U.S. COMMERCIAL LAUNCH SERVICES INDUSTRY
AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Dennis R. Dunbar & Lee R. Scherer
General Dynamics
Commercial Launch Services

Abstract
This paper discusses the threat to our fledgling commercial ELV
industry of current and anticipated foreign competition, which is
generally subsidized by their governments. It considers actions that
might be taken by U.S. industry members to improve their
competitive position and steps that might be considered by the U.S.
government to support this industry so important to the U.S. national
strategic posture.
Introduction
From the birth of the space age until about 1980, the United States
had a monopoly on space launches in the free world. The decision by
the United States to cease purchasing expendable launch vehicles
and place all of our launch needs on the Space Shuttle was at least
one fundamental point in the decision of the European community to
develop its own ELV - the Ariane. Although Ariane had the usual
infant mortality problems, it was soon evident that this European
vehicle would be a formidable competitor for the launching of
commercial satellites. The negative effect on our balance of trade
could be significant.
In 1983 the decision was made to allow privatization of the
government - developed launch vehicles and the U.S. commercial
launch services industry was born. The brief history of this industry
has been one of continuing and difficult competition.
Throughout this paper, the commercial launch services industry is
defined in a narrow sense as those larger launch vehicles originally
developed under government contract.
Launch services using
improved versions of such vehicles are being marketed by General
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Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Martin Marietta to foreign and
commercial customers, primarily for communication satellites.
There is another segment of this industry which will not be covered
It consists primarily of entrepreneurs developing
in this paper.
smaller vehicles, generally for low earth orbit missions. Members
of this group include Space Services, E Prime, Conatec, American
Their future
Rocket, Orbital Sciences, and most recently LTV.
depends on the need for smaller satellites by government and
Recent increase in interest within the
commercial customers.
government for light satellites has brought more promise to this
segment.
Industry Phases
Competition to our commercial ELV industry can be divided into
rather distinct phases as follows:
Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase

I 83-86
II 87-88
III 89
IV 90+

Space Shuttle
Ariane
Long March
TBD

Phase I - Space Shuttle
In order to attract the maximum number of commercial customers to
the Shuttle, which would keep the launch rate high and the cost per
flight down, a pricing formula was established which was very
attractive to the satellite owners. The Ariane was being offered at
similar prices with the backing of the European member nations. It
was a price war in which the U.S. commercial industry could not
participate since the cost for building one of our vehicles was much
more than the price offered by either Shuttle or Ariane.
The U.S. commercial industry could not compete with its own
government.
Phase II Ariane
The Challenger tragedy was followed some months later by a
Presidental directive that the Shuttle would no longer carry
commercial payloads, with a small number of exceptions. The price
of Ariane increased, due in part to a weakened dollar, and our
industry (Figure 1) could compete on a more or less equal footing.
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This phase has brought modest success and each of the companies
have been able to obtain some firm contracts. In early 1989 the
total number of commercial contracts (non-DoD) is 21, and of these
11 are non-U.S. which represents a significant positive balance of
trade. This degree of success has been due in part to the fact that
many of the Shuttle customers moved quickly to Ariane after the
Presidential decision. This coupled with the two Ariane failures in
1986 and the resulting hiatus left the Ariane manifest very full.
Ariane is a tough competitor. The launch rate over the past twelve
months is enviable. Ten launches have been scheduled in 1989.
Recently a buy of 50 Ariane IV vehicles was announced.
This phase can be characterized as a wide-open free enterprise
competition.
The playing field is somewhat tilted in that
Arianespace enjoys more government support than do the U.S.
companies. These are in such areas as government funded R&D, and
other financial and insurance support.
For example, the R&D to
develop Ariane 4 and Ariane 5 were funded by the European Space
Agency (ESA) and is not recovered in prices charged to commercial
customers. The R&D to develop Atlas I, II, HA, and MAS were all
paid for by General Dynamics and must be recovered through
commercial sales. As another example, we must carry $500 Million
third party liability insurance with the U.S. government covering the
next $1.5 Billion. Arianespace is required to have about $70 Million
insurance with the French government covering all above that. A
very important difference in financial risk is in the area of launch
failure. If Ariane fails due to operational problems, Arianespace is
responsible. If the failure is due to a design problem, then ESA
covers the failure analysis and corrective actions. With the third
stage engine problems that occurred in 1986, media reports placed
the costs at some $300 Million. If U.S. companies have a failure of a
commercial vehicle, each company is responsible for all of the
costs.
During this phase General Dynamics assessed the market and the
competition and made the decision to proceed with the production of
18 Atlas I vehicles when we did not have a single order. We knew
that we could compete with Arianespace only through a quantity buy.
This is the kind of risk-taking measures that the commercial
business requires if one is to be successful. Later we were awa ded
the MLV-2 contract by the Air Force and we further increased our
exposure by committing to production of commercial variances of
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this larger vehicle. There is no question that we are committed to
full competition with Ariane and with our American peers.
Phase III - Long March
In mid-1988 Aussat held a competition for its next generation of
satellites. The three U.S. spacecraft companies bid as well as a
European team of British Aerospace and Matra. Hughes was selected
as winner. The Australians asked Hughes to obtain export licenses
to ship their two spacecraft to China for launch on Long March, since
the launch costs were only about 1/3 as much as those of any U.S.
launch provider or Ariane. At the same time a consortium called
Asiasat, who owns the recovered Westar 6 spacecraft, asked Hughes
to obtain an export license for that satellite.
Whether or not such licenses should be granted and, if so, under what
conditions, then became a prime subject for debate within many
departments of the Administration and on the Hill. Figure 2 shows
that the Chinese are developing a family of launch vehicles that
encompass a very broad spectrum of payloads.
The U.S. industry's argument against Long March can be summarized
in four distinct categories:
1. Inconsistency of National Policy - The Administration and
Congress had strongly urged the U.S. companies to enter the
commercial arena. We have subsequently all made major capital
Now, before we have even made our first
investments.
commercial launch, a different policy allowing China, a nonmarket economy, entry into this market can serve to kill the
industry established by the earlier policy.
2. Negative effect on national security.
(a) A major agrument for government support of the commercial
ELV industry initially was that it constituted a "reserve
fleet" in the event that one or more Defense vehicle programs
are grounded. Long March entry will likely cause drop out of
one or more of the U.S. companies decreasing or eliminating
such a back-up.
(b) A concurrent commercial industry reduces the cost of launch
services to the Air Force. For the MLV-2 competition, we
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were able to show that our having embarked on a commercial
program resulted in a substantial savings to the Air Force.
(c) The Long March vehicle required to launch Aussat must be of
twice the performance of the existing vehicle. Providing the
incentive for the growth of a potential weapon system by a
factor of two is certainly not in the best interest of our
national security.
3. Technology Transfer - The U.S. is far ahead of the Chinese in
Integration of a satellite on a launch
satellite technology.
vehicle requires exchange of substantial technical information.
Under the Aussat contract there are significant penalties for
schedule delays. The U.S. satellite company will have a strong
motivation to assist with problems that arise in development of
this growth vehicle. This is not only with techical problems, but
in management techniques and documentation requirements that
we have learned over the past 30 years - often the hard way.
We know that satellites can remain essentially intact if a launch
Many here
vehicle is destroyed early in the launch phase.
remember the OTS launch on Delta in 1977. The spacecraft was
recovered and remained on display at ESTEC in Europe for some
There have been similar occurrences with military
time.
payloads. Recovery by the Chinese of such a U.S. satellite would
be a major technology gain for them.
4. Unfair Trade Practices - A capitalistic country cannot compete
with a non-market economy whose prime interests are prestige,
technology and obtaining of hard currency. A controlled economy
can charge any price it chooses. If there are no restrictions PRC
can capture as much of the market as their production
capabilities allow.
Our arguments were accepted by many, but also opposed by many who
believe in a free trade policy for this country and that market forces
should prevail. Aussat threatened to reconsider its offer to Hughes
if the licenses were not approved, so loss of the U.S. business had to
be considered. There were foreign policy implications about which
we can only guess but obviously the U.S. wishes to better its
relations with the PRC and we know the Chinese placed a high
priority on gaining approval for launching of these satellites.
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The issue had to be elevated to the very top. In November 1988 the
President approved the granting of export licenses for the three
satellites subject to certain conditions. There had to be assurances
that there would be no technology transfer; the PRC had to sign the
liability treaties that other nations have signed; and there had to be
an agreement to "prevent possible unfair Chinese pricing or trade
practices. 11 The first two points were concluded quickly. The last
was much more difficult and the agreement was not signed until late
January.
Some major conditions in the agreement are that the Chinese may be
given export licenses for as many as nine launches over the six year
period 1989 - 1994. Their price and terms and conditions must be
won a par11 with those of western launchers. They cannot charge
promotional prices except for the first successful launch of a new
vehicle. Their commitments must be spread proportionally over the
six-year period.
Monitoring of this agreement by our government will not be easy.
Probably most difficult will be the determination on what pricing
*on a par" means since this requires the gathering 'of proprietary
which companies may or may not be willing to share.
In any event, today the U.S. companies must not only compete with an
aggressive and capable Arianespace; but also with PRC, a nonmarket economy, with whom an already thin market must be shared.
Phase IV - TBD

The danger with the Long March decision is the precedence that it
sets. The U.S. has used the export licenses as an instrument of
foreign policy.. What happens if the same process is requested by the
USSR for Proton launches? Today there is a strong edict against
exporting, of U.S. spacecraft into the Soviet Union. Suppose the
Soviets launch from, outside the Soviet Union', such as from' Cape
York? This certainly reduces the technology transfer issue. Or
suppose Proton Is
to another organization in. the free world to
launch? What then would our policy on export of U.S.
be?
The USSR has an awesome launch capability which could
the commercial market. The relationship
our 'two countries
may or may not soon
the
that
would be allowed' to
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launch U.S. spacecraft. But there are other competitors coming down
the road, Japan followed possibly by others like Brazil, India, and
Israel.
The Long March decision with a quantity standard was cartelization.
We have started dividing up the pie. Each new entry will want its
fair share.
Phase IV may determine whether there is a commercial ELV industry
at all, or whether our commercial satellite industry will be
completely dependent on foreign launch services.
Conclusion
Where is this all going to lead? The answer is unclear at this point
in time.
There are certain things that our industry must do to
survive:
1. We must recognize that we are in a commercial business with
aggressive foreign competition for whom there are elements of
national assistance that can probably never be completely
irradicated.
2. To compete we have to take risks which were unheard of with our
comfortable government contracts of the past.
If General
Dynamics had not committed to produce 18 vehicles without a
single order there is no telling what our status would be today.
3. We have to aggressively seek ways of reducing costs while still
maintaining or improving our high reliability.
Arianespace has
just announced a 50 vehicle $3 Billion production order. That is a
tremendous industrial base over which to spread costs.
4. We have to do a continuing and effective job of convincing
Congress and the Administration of the importance of maintaining
a viable commercial launch services industry and seek support
where required.
But no actions that we can take may prove sufficient to keep us in
the business without our own government's support. In discussions
with various Departments before the Long March decision, we found
a number of free trade advocates. One stated bluntly "If the Chinese
price for Long March in only 1/3 as much as U.S. industry's price it
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sounds like you folks could use a little competition." This attitude
completely ignores the fact that Chinese workers are paid 20 to 50
dollars per month. Or that President Reagan has stated that a viable
commercial ELV industry is vital to our national security. Or that if
we lose the ELV industry the satellite industry will surely follow.
From our government;
1. We need a priority effort in the establishment of the legendary
Discussions
international 'level playing field 11 for the industry.
have been held for the last three years with Arianespace with
little progress.
2. We need firm quick reactions against Chinese violations of the
Long March Agreement, which calls for pricing on a par with
western^ launchers and proportional distribution of the
commitments over the six year period of the agreement, The
export license process in controlled by the State Department.
Monitoring of the agreement is done by the U.S. Trade
The only real club we have against IPIRC
Representative.
violations is the denial or revoking of export licenses, We have
one example in our industry of a claim of unfair trade practices
by TCI against Arianesapce. The procedure took 18 months. If
export license approvals were to continue' while deliberations
over agreement violations are underway over such a period, we
are liable to be out of business before a finding is ever reached.
3. We need an unwavering stance by our government against allowing
entry of the USSR into the international market. There is no way
any of us can compete against a non-market economy who is

launching 90 vehicles a year;
Without our Industry's own extensive eff ort and dedication and
without the U.S. government's backing it is fair to say that the
history of the U.S. commercial ELV industry will be very brief.
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